two types of Moral Reasoning: consequential and categorical

source: Justice by Michael Sandel @ Harvard University

Moral principal(or 도덕적 원칙)
* consequential moral reasoning: 결과론적
- locates morality in the consequences of an act
- 대표적인 예는 Utilitarianism, doctrine invented by Jaremy Bentham(18C English)

* categorical moral reasoning
- locates morality in certain duties and rights
- 대표적인 예는 Immanuel Kant(18C German)

... look at your syllabus. you'll notice that we read a number of great and famous books. books by Aristotle, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and others. you'll notice, too, from the syllabus that we don't only read these books. we also take up contemporary political and legal controversies that raise philosophical questions. we will debate equality and inequality, affirmative action, free speech versus hate speech, same-sex marriage, mmilitary conscription, a rage of practical questions. why?
not just to enliven these abstract and distant books, but to make clear, to bring out what's at stake in our everyday lives, including our political lives, for philosophy. and so we will read these books and we will debate these issues, and we'll see how each informs and lluminates the other. this may sound appealing enough. but here I have to issue a warning.
and the warning is this: to read this books in this way, as an exercise in self-knowledge, to read them in this way carries certain risks. risks that are both personal and political: risks that every student of political philosophy has known. this risks spring from the fact that philosophy teaches us and unsettles us by confronting us with what we already know. there's an irony.
the difficulty of this course consists in the fact that it teaches what you already know. it works by taking what we know from familiar, unquestioned settings and making it strange. that's how those examples work... worked. the hypotheticals with which we began, with their mix of playfulness and sobriety. it's also how these philosophical books work. philosophy estranges us from the familiar, not by supplying new information, but by inviting and provoking a new way of seeing. but, and here's the risk, once the familiar turns strange, it's never quite the same again.
self-knowledge is like lost innocence. however unsettling you find it, it can never be unthought or unknown. what makes this enterprise difficult, but also riveting, is thatt moral and political philosophy is a story, and you don't know where the story will lead. but what you do know is that the story is about you. those are the personal risks.
now, what of the political risks? one way of introducing a course like this would be to promise you that by reading these books and debating these issues, you will become a better, more responsible citize. you will examine the presuppositions of public policy. you will hone your political judgment. you will become a more effective participant in public affairs. but this would be a partial and misleading promise. political philosophy, for the most part, hasn't worked that way. you have to allow for the possibility that political philosophy may make you a worse citizen rather than a better one, or at least a worse citizen before it makes you a better one. and that's because philosophy is a distancing, even debilitating activity. and you see this going back to Socrates. there's a dialogue, the Gorgias, in which one of Socrates' friends, Callicles, tries to talk him out of philosophizing. Callicles tells Socrates, 'philosophy is a pretty toy in one indulges in it with moderation at the right time of life. but if one pursues it further than one should, it is absolute ruin. take my advice, 'Callicles says, 'abandon argument. learn the accomplishments of active life. take for your models not those people who spend their time on these petty quibbles, but those who have a good livelihood and reputation and many other blessings.' so Callicles is really saying to Socrates, 'Quit philosophizing. get real. goto business school.' and Callicles did have a point. he had a point, because hilosophy distances us from conventions, from established assumptions, and from subtle beliefs. those are the risks, personal and political.
and in the face of these risks, there is a characteristic evasion. the name of the evasion is skepticism. it's the idea... well, it goes something like this. we didn't resolve once and for all either the cases or the principles we were arguing when we began. and if Aristotle and Locke and Kant and Mill haven't solved these questions after all of these years, whoare we to thing that se, here in Sanders Theater, over the course of a semester, can resolve them? and so maybe it's just a matter of each person having his or her own principles, and there's nothing more to be said about it. no way of reasoning. that's the evasing, the evasion of skepticism, to which I would offer the following reply.
it's true, these questions have been debated for a very long time. but the very fact that they have recurred and persisted may suggest that, though they're impossible in one sense, they're unavoidable in another. and the reason they're unavoidable, the reason they're inescapable, is that we live some answer to these questions every day. so skepticism, just throwing up your hands and giving up on moral reflection, is no solution.
Immanuel Kant described very well the problem with skepticism when he wrote, 'Skepticism is a resting place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings. but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement. simply to acquiesce in skepticism.' Kant wrote, 'can never suffice to overcome the reslessness of reason.' I've tried to suggest, through these stories and these arguments, some sense of the risks and temptations, of the perils and the possibilities. I would simply conclude by saying that the aim of this course is to awaken the restlessness of reason and to see where it might lead. thank you very much...